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The Judicialpower of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted againstone of the United
States by Citizens of another State ....

-Eleventh

Amendment'

[Tihe bare text of the Amendment is not an exhaustive description of the
States' constitutional immunity from suit.
2
-Justice Kennedy, Alden v. Maine

INTRODUCTION

As Justice Kennedy's understatement suggests, and the jurisprudence of the modern United States Supreme Court certainly confirms, 3 the scope of the states' immunity from private suits reaches

beyond the text of the Eleventh Amendment 4 to encompass the "fundamental postulates implicit in the constitutional design. '5 On May
28, 2002, the Rehnquist Court continued its extension of the state sovereign immunity doctrine, holding in Federal Maritime Commission v.
South Carolina State Ports Authority6 that the Eleventh Amendment

barred the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC), an administrative
agency, from adjudicating a private party's complaint against a nonconsenting state. 7 Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas emphasized the overwhelming procedural similarities between the FMC's
administrative adjudications and federal civil litigation,8 concluding
that the former equally affronted the "dignity that is consistent with
[the states'] status as sovereign entities." 9 Furthermore, he stressed
that the FMC and other administrative agencies remain free to investigate supposed violations of federal law by the states, even based upon
information supplied by private parties, and to institute their own le-

I

U.S. Const. amend. XI.
527 U.S. 706, 736 (1999).
3
See id.; Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864 (2002); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
4 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
5 Alden, 527 U.S. at 729.
6 122 S.Ct. 1864 (2002).
7 See id.
8 See id. at 1872-74.
9 Id. at 1874.
2
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gal action to enforce that law."' "The only step the FMC may not
take[,] .. ." stated Justice Thomas, "is to adjudicate a dispute between
a private party and a nonconsenting State."''
Notably, Justices Breyer and Stevens, in separate dissents joined
by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, condemned the decision as irreconcilable with the text of the Constitution and reaffirmed their commitment to "continued dissent," so long as the majority followed its
chosen jurisprudential path. 12 Immediate criticism of the decision
arose from academic and journalist circles as well, accusing the majority of turning the state sovereign immunity doctrine "into an assault
weapon against Congress""' and of partaking in the sort of broad interpretative leap that, "were it taken by liberal judges, conservatives
would denounce as 'activist. '""14 Furthermore, critics-echoing
Breyer's dissent-warned of the holding's practical impact, namely on
state employees whose health and safety are at risk and on hospital
patients who wish to bring administrative complaints about substandard care.'5 More broadly, they claimed the decision might discourage federal agencies, from the Securities and Exchange Commission
to the Environmental Protection Agency, from entertaining complaints by private citizens and organizations and thereby bolster states'
confidence to openly disregard federal law.16
As Justice Breyer and his colleagues in dissent suggest, the holding in FederalMaritime Commission was not inevitable. In particular, the
Court's seemingly key determination-that administrative proceedings constitute a functionally judicial and thus inappropriate forum in
which to adjudicate complaints by private litigants against stateslacks any firm textual support in the Eleventh Amendment. 1 7 Even
Justice Thomas referred to the "relatively barren historical record" on
the issue, attributing the dearth of guidance to the Framers' inability
to foresee the existence of the modern administrative state. 8 Instead,
Thomas uncharacteristically relied on the Court of Appeals' functionm
'

12
13

See id. at 1878-79.
See id. at 1879 n.19.
See id. at 1889 (Breyer, j., dissenting).
Cass Sunstein, A Narrowed Right to Challenge the States, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2002, at

A23.
14
A Narrow View of Federal Power, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2002, at A20 [hereinafter Narrow
View]; see Extreme View of States' Rights, CHA-r'ANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, June 1,2002, at B6
[hereinafter Extreme View].
15
See Fed. Mar. Commnn, 122 S. Ct. at 1888 (BreyerJ., dissenting); see also Narrow View,
supra note 14 (noting that "the decision will make it harder for state workers to enlist the
aid of federal agencies").
16 See Extreme View, supra note 14.
17
See Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 122 S. Ct. at 1883 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that federal
administrative agencies exercise the executive power of the United States, not the explicitly
prohibited judicial power).
18
Id. at 1872.
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alist analogy between the FMC's adjudicative procedures and federal
civil litigation' - Nonetheless, while the majority's decision in Federal
Maritime Commission may appear both tenuous and burdensome, it
makes more sense when it is viewed as part of the Rehnquist Court's
sweeping campaign to constrict Congress's power to impose 2 , and enforce 2' regulatory standards. Such a perspective explains both the
majority's holding and the dissent's apoplectic response in calling for
"continued dissent," 2 particularly as agencies may still bring enforcement actions on their own behalf.
This Note argues that, while Justice Breyer's call for "continued
dissent" may be justified, it is also too little too late. Part I briefly
explores the historical origins of the Eleventh Amendment and the
Supreme Court's recent expansions of the state sovereign immunity
doctrine, with particular emphasis on the Court's decisions in Seminole
Tribe v. Florida23 and Alden v. Maine.24 Part II frames the arguments by
the majority and dissenters in FederalMaritime Commission. Part III investigates the motives behind the dissents of Justices Breyer and Stevens, suggesting that their disagreement does not attack this
particular holding so much as it does the past one hundred years of
precedent supporting it. Part III also surveys the practical implications of the Federal Maritime Commission decision, proposing that a
number of well-established exceptions to the state sovereign immunity
doctrine may prove the dissenters' fears unfounded. Finally, Part III
seeks to explain the decision as part of an overall attempt by the Rehnquist Court to place substantive and remedial constrictions on Con19 See id. at 1873-74; S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 243 F.3d 165, 174
(4th Cir. 2001) (noting that the FMC proceeding "walks, talks, and squawks very much like
a lawsuit").
20 The Court's recent Commerce Clause decisions illustrate this point. See, e.g.,
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that the Violence Against Women
Act exceeded Commerce Clause authority); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)
(holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause authority). Recent commandeering jurisprudence in the Court is also illustrative. See, e.g.,
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (federal statutory requirement that state law
enforcement officers conduct handgun purchaser background checks held to be unconstitutional); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (federal statute's "take title"
provision, requiring states to accept or regulate waste, lay outside Congress's enumerated
powers).
21
See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (holding that an individual lacks standing to sue the government, absent suffering distinct and concrete harm,
and that mere congressional conferral upon all persons of an abstract right to have the
Executive observe procedures required by law is also insufficient for standing).
22 See Fed. Mar. Comm'n., 122 S.Ct. at 1889 (Breyer, J.,dissenting).
23 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996) (holding that even though
Article I of the Constitution gives Congress full authority to regulate commerce with Indian tribes, Congress cannot allow a tribe to sue a state in federal court).
24 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999) (holding that Congress lacks the constitutional authority to compel Maine state courts to hear workers' suits under the Fair
Labor Standards Act).
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gress's use of private suits to enforce and increase regulatory actions.
This Note ultimately concludes that Justice Breyer and his colleagues
in dissent should see that their true error lies not in failing to contain
this particular tempest, but in failing ten years earlier to forecast a
much larger jurisprudential storm that would leave in its wake a more
robust vision of state autonomy, limited congressional power, and a
particularly potent executive.
I
THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

A.

Historical Origins of the Eleventh Amendment

The Eleventh Amendment provides that the "U]udicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another [s] tate .... ,,25 Although the choice of words indicates careful deliberation, 26 since the late nineteenth century the Supreme Court has interpreted the Amendment with such expansive
breadth that its current jurisprudence bears almost no relation to the
Amendment's text. 27 Rather than adhere solely to textual directives,
the Court has explained that "the scope of the States' immunity from
suit is demarcated.., by fundamental postulates implicit in the consti8
tutional design."
What were the origins of these fundamental postulates? How did
they arise? As the Founders gathered in 1787 to draft the principles
for the United States government, they were inescapably cognizant of
the English common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity. 29 English
law acknowledged that the king remained immune from suit in his
own courts, absent his consent. 30 Derived from the unique character
of the intended defendant, 3' the doctrine operated as a jurisdictional
bar to preserve the sanctity of the royal seat and protect the sovereign
25

U.S. CONST. amend XI.

SeeJohn V. Orth, History and the Eleventh Amendment, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1147,
1147-49 (2000) (noting explicit references to the parallel legal systems of "law" and "equity" as well as the distinction between those suits "commenced" and those "prosecuted,"
which refers to two different stages of litigation).
27 See Carlos Manuel VAzquez, W41hat Is Eleventh Amendment hnmunity, 106 YALE L.J.
1683, 1694-95 (1997).
28
Alden, 527 U.S. at 729.
29
See CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 4-5
(1972).
30
See id. at 5 (noting that the doctrine of sovereign immunity existed as early as the
thirteenth century, during the reign of Henry I1 (1216-1272)); Orth, supra note 26, at
1155.
'31 See Orth, supra note 26, at 1155.
26
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from personal charges against his public acts. 32 Nonetheless, the doc-

trine lacked potency, particularly by the time of the American Revolution, as English jurists developed a "variety of procedures [to] redress
33
...wrongs suffered by the subject at the hands of his sovereign."
Thus, the doctrine mostly determined the procedural guidelines for
how relief could be obtained, but did not impair the subject's right to
34
recover based on substantive law.

Of course, the Founders did not merely adopt English law at the
Constitutional Convention, 35 and from the face of the original document they produced, no manifest restrictions prevented the judiciary
from adjudicating suits commenced by private citizens against states.3 6
Similar uncertainty colors the Judiciary Act of 1789,1 7 the congressional legislation creating the inferior federal courts and defining
their jurisdiction; like Article III, it also neglects to state whether states
are subject to suit by citizens of other states. 3 3 While gaps in the historical record may make it impossible today to determine how the
SeeJACOBS, supra note 29, at 7-8.
Id. at 5-6 (including petition of right, suits for damages against subordinate officers, prerogative writs, and monstrans de droit, "whereby a subject might, in order to obtain
possession or restitution of property claimed by the crown, [use] the record upon which
the crown made claim [as a basis for] his own right"); id. at 165 n.6.
34
See id. at 6.
35
See Orth, supra note 26, at 1155. Professor Randall suggests that the time-honored
American belief that the sovereign could not be sued absent his consent came to the colonies via the widely-known writings of Sir William Blackstone. See Susan Randall, Sovereign
Immunity and the Uses of History, 81 NEB. L. REv. 1, 26-27 (2002). Ultimately, Blackstone's
distortion of English sovereign immunity became entrenched after repetition by Alexander
Hamilton in The FederalistNo. 81 and by James Madison and John Marshall at the Virginia
ratification convention. See THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton); Randall, supra,
at 28. Nonetheless, Randall argues that the later writings of these Framers, as well as their
conception of a strong centralized government, imply that their statements in The Federalist
and at the ratification debates were merely part of a political strategy to calm Anti-Federalist fears about the solvency of the states and to secure ratification. See Randall, supra, at
70-85.
36
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Article III states:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
tinder this Constitution, the Laws of the United States,... [and] to Controversies between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of different States.... and between a State,
or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
Jacobs notes the ambiguity inherent in the Article, which neither explicitly allows nor forbids the judiciary power to adjudicate cases in which a private citizen names a state as a
defendant, and posits that the Framers may have intended the clause to "extend[ ] the
judicial power only to cases in which [a] state was the plaintiff." JACOBS, supra note 29, at
19-20. He also notes that the convention records yield no answer to the question of the
Founders' intent. See id. at 21-22.
37 An Act to Establish theJudicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73,
80-81 (1789).
38
SeeJACOBS, supra note 29, at 41-42 (noting that the Judiciary Act may clarify the
original meaning of Article III, as many who deliberated upon and passed the Act also
participated in the framing and ratifying of the Constitution).
32

-33
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Founders envisioned state sovereign immunity,-" such ambiguity
failed to deter the Supreme Court from immediately recognizing suits
4
in which a private citizen named a state as defendant. 1
The catalyst for the passage of the Eleventh Amendment was
Chisholm v. Georgia,4 1 in which the estate of a deceased South Carolina
merchant brought an action against the State of Georgia to recover an
unpaid war debt.4 2 Georgia immediately invoked immunity, which
the circuit court, including Supreme Court Justice James Iredell and
43
District Judge Nathaniel Pendleton, sustained, dismissing the suit.

The Supreme Court reversed, holding by a four-to-one majority that
Article III empowered citizens of one state to sue another state in federal court. 44 Reaction came quickly, in the form of a congressional
45
resolution proposing the Eleventh Amendment in March of 1794.

Fueled by the Court's subsequent assertion of jurisdiction over suits
against Virginia, 46 Massachusetts,

47

and Georgia, 48 all of the states nec-

See Orth, supra note 26, at 1157.
See Oswald v. New York, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 401 (1792); Vanstophorst v. Maryland, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 401 (1791). These first cases fail to garner much attention since in Vanstophorst the defendant state failed to enter a formal protest on the ground of state sovereign immunity, and in Oswald, due to considerable motion-making by both parties, the
case concluded after the decision in Chisholm. SeeJAcoBs, supra note 29, at 43-46.
41
2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793).
42
See generally Doyle Mathis, Chisholm v. Georgia: Background and Settlement, 54J. AM.
HIST. 19, 19-29 (1967) (detailing the factual background leading up to the suit).
43
SeeJAcoBs, supra note 29, at 47.
44
See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 419-20, 479-80. Interestingly, all of the Justices
participating in the decision played key roles in the development and ratification of the
Constitution. Justices Wilson and Blair, both in the majority, had served as delegates to the
Constitutional Convention five years earlier. Chief Justice Jay, also in the majority, coauthored The Federalist Papers and, along with Justice Cushing in the majority and Justice
Iredell, the lone dissenter, served as members of their state conventions. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRsr HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at
20 (1985);JAcoBs, supra note 29, at 50-51. One commentator sees the cavalier dismissal of
these opinions by the current Court as "surprising," particularly in light of the Rehnquist
majority's emphasis on the Framers' intent. See Orth, supra note 26, at 1150-51 (citing
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 724 (1999)).
45
See JACOBS, supra note 29, at 66-67. On January 15, 1794, the Senate passed the
resolution by a vote of twenty-three to two. On March 4, the House of Representatives
approved the same resolution by a vote of eighty-one to nine. i.
46 See Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 378 (1798).
47
William Vassall initiated an equity suit in the Supreme Court against Massachusetts
in 1793, alleging property losses he suffered as the result of being labeled a Loyalist. See 5
39

40

THE DOCUMENTARY HIsToRY' OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,

1789-1800, at

352-59 (Maeva Marcus et al. eds., 1994). Vassall's suit never went forward, however, as
Massachusetts refused to appeal- in Court while the state legislature and then-Governor
John Hancock considered how the state should respond to the Court's subpoena. Id. at
365-67. Ultimately, the case carried over several Terms until it was dismissed in February
1797. Id. at 369.
48
In 1795, land speculators Alexander Moultrie and Isaac Huger filed a bill of equity
in the Supreme Court against Georgia, seeking specific performance of a contract granting
them a right of preemption on a land sale. Id. at 496, 506. The Court issued subpoenas to
certain state officials, but again the state refused to answer until its legislature issued a

2003]

STATE SOVEREIGN IMM UNITY

1801

essary for ratification completed the process by February of 1795. 4 9'
The new Amendment explicitly barred the federal judiciary from adjudicating suits brought against a state by citizens of another state
(like Chisholm). However, as noted above, the scope of the Eleventh
Amendment would expand considerably by the end of the next
century.
B. Judicial Expansion of State Sovereign Immunity
1. Hans v. Louisiana
Like Chisholm, the seminal case of Hans v. Louisianawas a creditor's suit by a private citizen against one of the many southern states
burdened by enormous postwar debt.50 Unlike the plaintiff in
Chisholm, however, Hans resided in the defendant state, Louisiana,
thus placing him outside the explicit restrictions of the Eleventh
Amendment's text.51

Nonetheless, Louisiana claimed immunity.5 2

While Justice Bradley, writing for the majority, recognized that the
Amendment by its terms appeared inapplicable, 53 he nevertheless sustained the circuit court's dismissal, holding that the judicial power of
the United States does not extend to suits instituted against a state by
4
its own citizens under the federal question clause of Article III.5
remonstrance to Congress. Id. at 508-09. The Court did not consider the case again until
after the passage of the Eleventh Amendment, at which point it dismissed the action for
lack ofjurisdiction. Id. at 511.
49 SeeJAcoBs, supra note 29, at 67. Jacobs argues that the extremely erratic certification of the states' ratification by Presidents Washington and Adams delayed recognition of
the Amendment as part of the Constitution until 1798. See id. Nonetheless, jurists and
commentators alike view the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment as swift and decisive.
SeeAlden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 724 (1999); CURRIE, supra note 44, at 18 n.101. Commentators offer two explanations for the rapid and widespread public support for the Amendment. Some suggest that the Amendment reaffirmed a common understanding prevalent
at the time the states ratified the Constitution. See, e.g., CHARLES GROVE HAINES, THE ROLE
OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS, 1789-1835, at 138 & n.88

(1960). Others contend that the Amendment gained approval because states desired protection from their creditors. See, e.g.,
Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers:
Sovereign. Imnunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19 (1963). The current Court appears to adopt
both views. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 724, 750.
50
134 U.S. 1 (1890); see also Orth, supra note 26, at 1156-57 (suggesting that if state
indebtedness was relevant to the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment, then it may also
have been relevant to the decision in Hans). Other commentators suggest that the holding
in Hans stemmed from an interpretation of the Constitution consistent with the Anti-Reconstruction, Anti-Federalist vision then prevalent on the Supreme Court, "rather than an
honest assessment of the history of Article III and the Eleventh Amendment." John E.
Nowak, The Gang of Five & the Second Coming of an Anti-Reconstruction Supreme Court, 75
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1091, 1094 (2000).
51
See Hans, 134 U.S. at 10.
52

53

Id. at 3.

See id.at 10.
See id. at 9-10, 21; see also North Carolina v. Temple, 134 U.S. 22, 30 (1890) (reversing on similar grounds a circuit court's decree ordering the state to pay a debt owed to one
of the state's citizens). Some commentators rightly question "the tenuous nature of the

54

1802
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In so doing, Bradley adopted the position that the ratification of
55
the Eleventh Amendment not only rectified the error in Chisholm,
but also recognized a constitutional principle of sovereign immunity
implicitly curtailing the judicial power of Article III. 5 1, This principle

arose from "the presumption that no anomalous and unheard-of proceedings or suits [at the time of the nation's founding] were intended
to be raised up by the Constitution."5' 7 Since "[t] he suability of a State
[by its citizens] .

.

. was a thing unknown to the law" when the states

ratified the Constitution, the Hans Court presumed that federal courts
lacked the power to hear such suits. 5s

While this argument ignores

the permissive language of Article III, commentators suggest that it
creates sound constitutional policy in light of the Eleventh Amendment since it equally deprives both a state's citizens and noncitizens of
a federal judicial remedy.5 9 Regardless, the Hans presumption in
favor of a state's immunity from suit, and against "anomalous" proceedings, proved to be fertile ground for the Rehnquist Court's more
tenuous expansions of the doctrine.6"
2.

Seminole Tribe v. Florida & Alden v. Maine

While Hans recognized a broader doctrine of state sovereign immunity than is evident from the text of the Eleventh Amendment, recent developments question Congress's authority to abrogate this
immunity and thus subject states to suit under federal law."1 Prior to
'federal' claim of impairment of contract," suggesting the Court's decision could have
rested on narrower grounds. RiCHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM SUPPLEMENT 145 (4th ed. Supp. 2002).

55 Justice Harlan, concurring, disagreed with Bradley's remarks that the decision in
Chisholm was in error. Rather, Harlan thought that Chisholm was "based upon a sound
interpretation of the Constitution as that instrument then was." Hans, 134 U.S. at 21
(Harlan, J., concurring). One commentator suggests that the reason Harlan nevertheless
concurred in the opinion is that he believed "a remedy should be available to the plaintiff
in the form of a suit against a state officer." Orth, supra note 26, at 1152. The Court made
this course of action available to plaintiffs in 1908. See Ex pare Young, 209 U.S. 123, 168
(1908).
56 See Hans, 134 U.S. at 15-16; JAcoBS, supra note 29, at 110.
57 Hans, 134 U.S. at 18.
58 Id. at 16.
59
SeeJAcoBs, supra note 29, at 110. Jacobs also notes that none of the Framers appear
to have contemplated that the federal question clause enabled a state to be sued in federal
court by one of its citizens. See id.
60 See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1871-72
(2002); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715-16 (1999); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44, 54 (1996).
61 Judge Fletcher of the Ninth Circuit offers three plausible explanations for the recent explosion of Eleventh Alnendmentjurisprudence: (1) the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment; (2) the rulings of the Warren Court, as exemplified in Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); and (3) the expansion of federal statutory obligations imposed upon states. See William A. Fletcher, The Eleventh Amendment: Unfinished Business, 75
NOTRE DAME

L. REv. 843, 846 (2000).
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its decision in Seminole Tribe, the Court had acknowledged this congressional vitiating power as arising from Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 62 as well as from the Commerce Clause." 3 The latter
theory rested upon the premise that the ill-defined immunity outside
the text of the Eleventh Amendment constituted a form of federal
common law-a default rule that Congress could override by merely
enacting legislation. 64 However, by rejecting this reasoning and distinguishing Congress's powers under the Fourteenth Amendment
from its Article I powers-obviously enacted prior to the passage of
the Eleventh Amendment 65-the Court in Seminole Tribe, by a five-tofour vote, reaffirmed that the immunity recognized in Hans was of
constitutional stature. 66 Thus, Congress lacked the power under Article I to circumvent the Eleventh Amendment limitations on federal
67
jurisdiction.
Coincidentally, Seminole Tribe instigated the Court's most significant and controversial Eleventh Amendment decision to date-Alden
v. Maine-because it pressed plaintiffs to consider state courts as alternative forums for federal claims against states.68 The Seminole Tribe
decision compelled a federal district court to dismiss a suit pending
against Maine by a group of state probation officers for alleged violations of the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act
62

See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (reasoning that the Fourteenth

Amendment gave Congress the power to abrogate a state's constitutionally protected immunity because the Amendment, by its own terms, fashioned a major change in relations
between the federal and state governments).
63 See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 14 (1989).
64 See id. at 25 (Stevens, J., concurring). The plurality opinion by Justice Brennan
attempted to analogize the commerce power to the Section 5 power, but that reasoning
attracted few supporters. See Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the Future of
Federalism, 1999 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 11 (1999).
65 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 65-66. Vzquez questions the conclusion in Seminole
Tribe and Fitzpatrickthat as the Fourteenth Amendment fundamentally altered federal-state
relations, it thereby authorized Congress to abrogate state immunity via its Section 5 enforcement power. See Vdzquez, supra note 27, at 1750. Specifically, he argues that the
alteration did not necessarily establish congressional power to subject states to suit in federal courts. See id. Moreover, even if the shift did grant Congress such power, the Fourteenth Amendment may be construed to incorporate Congress's Article I powers for
abrogation purposes, just as that amendment's Due Process Clause incorporated the Bill of
Rights. See id. Regardless, recent Supreme Court decisions have set such high standards
for congressional invocation of Section 5 authority to abrogate states' immunity that few
regulatory programs are likely to be eligible. See, e.g., Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (Trademark Remedy Clarification Act
does not qualify).
66 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 64 (stating that the Eleventh Amendment stands for
'the constitutional principle that state sovereign immunity limited the federal courts'jurisdiction under Article 11").
67
See id. at 72-73.
68
SeeRoger C. Hartley, TheAlden Trilogy: Praise and Protest, 23 HARv.J.L. & PUB. PoC
323, 336-37 (2000).
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(FLSA) .69 Amendments to the FLSA granted employees the right to
sue states in their own courts for alleged violations of the Act.7 1 As a
result, the plaintiffs refiled their claim in state court, contending that
the Eleventh Amendment, as a forum allocating device, merely protected states from suits in federal court.7 1 The state trial court, however, dismissed the suit on the grounds of sovereign immunity, and a
72
divided Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed.
Justice Kennedy, writing for the same majority as in Seminole Tribe,
upheld the Maine court's decision, holding that Congress lacked the
authority "to subject nonconsenting States to private suits for damages
in state courts. '' 73 Once again, the text of the Eleventh Amendment,
particularly its reference to the federal judiciary, proved completely
irrelevant.7 4 Instead, the Court emphasized the principle from Hans
that "the sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from, nor is
limited by . . ." the Amendment's terms. 7 5 Rather, the Court stated,
sovereign immunity is inherent in the system of federalism and derives
from the history and structure of the Constitution. 76 On this view, the
Tenth Amendment and the federalist system substantiate the governing role of the states and their status as sovereign entities. 77 The
Court interpreted the Founders' silence on the matter as further
proof of a well-established principle, unaltered by the Constitution,
that a sovereign enjoys immunity from suit in its own courts. 78 In justice Kennedy's view, the Eleventh Amendment merely clarified specific aspects of this immunity and corrected the Chisholm decision. 79 A
broad immunity was necessary, however, to prevent the "'indignity of
subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the
instance of private parties .
."'Otherwise, the Court reasoned,
states would "face the prospect of being thrust, by federal fiat and
against [their] will, into the disfavored status of a debtor . ..."1
'.

69
See Mills v. Maine, No. 92-410-P-H, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9985 (D. Me. July 3,
1996), affd, 118 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 1997).
70 See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000).
71
See Alden v. State, 715 A.2d 172, 173 (Me. 1998).

72

See id. at 173, 176.

7"4 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999).
74 See James E. Pfander, Once More unto the Breach: Eleventh Amendment Scholarship and
the Court, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 817, 821 (2000) (suggesting that in Alden the Court
continued to abandon any purposive approach to its interpretation).
75 Alden, 527 U.S. at 713.
76 See id. at 730.
77
78

See id. at 713-14.
See id. at 741.

79
8o

See id. at 722-23.
Id. at 749 (quoting In reAyers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887)).

81

Id.
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Criticisms of the decision were numerous, and supporters few. 82
The dissent, led by Justice Souter, criticized the majority's opinion for
being steeped in indeterminate historical data. In particular, the dissent emphasized the lack of evidence that "the Tenth Amendment
constitutionalized a concept of sovereign immunity as inherent in the
notion of statehood"8' 3 or that the structure of the Constitution predicted a federalist system immunizing states from federal claims in any
court.8

4

Furthermore, while the majority emphasized that states re-

tain a good-faith duty to comply with federal law and that these obligations could still be enforced prospectively in suits against state
officers,8 5 critics argued that the decision further threatened the federal government's ability to provide and enforce remedies for federal
rights. 8 6 Unbeknownst to the dissent, the decision also laid the

groundwork for the Rehnquist Court's further remedial constrictions,
via the immunity doctrine, on Congress's ability to use private suits to
initiate and enforce administrative regulatory actions.
II
CASE DISCUSSION: FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION V. SOUTH

CAROLINA STATE PORTS AUTHORITy

A.

The Dispute and Agency Response Rejecting the Sovereign
Immunity Defense

The dispute in question arose when South Carolina Maritime Services, Inc. ("Maritime Services") applied on five occasions to the South
Carolina State Ports Authority (SCSPA) to berth a cruise ship, the M/
V Tropic Sea, at the Port of Charleston facilities. 87 Maritime Services
sought the berthing space as a port of call for gambling cruises, some
destined for the Bahamas and others merely traveling in international
waters before returning to Charleston.8 8 The SCSPA denied the re82
See, e.g.,
Nowak, supra note 50, at 1094 (arguing that 'Justice Kennedy's opinion is
based on nothing but the Gang of Five's view of how the federal system should work").
83
Alden, 527 U.S. at 761 (Souter, J., dissenting).
84
See id. at 798-803 (Souter, J., dissenting).
85
See id. at 754-57; see also Carlos Manuel Vtzquez, Sovereign Immunity, Due Process, and
the Alden Trilog, 109 YALE L.J. 1927, 1935 (2000). The Court also stressed that sovereign
immunity only bars suits in the absence of consent, thus mitigating the rigors of the doctrine. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 755. In fact, "[m]any states, on their own initiative, have enacted statutes consenting to a wide variety of suits." Id.
86
See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Principle and Compromise in ConstitutionalAdjudication: The
Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 953, 964 & n.38
(2000).
87
See Fed. Mar. Colnm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1868 (2002); see also
Elizabeth Herlong Campbell, U.S. Supreme Court Reinforces the Armor of the States' Sovereign.
Immunity: Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority, 14 S.C.
LAw. 48, 50 (2002) (detailing the background of the case from the viewpoint of SCSPA's
co-counsel).
88 Campbell, supra note 87, at 50.
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quests, citing an established policy of refusing berths in the Port of
Charleston to any vessel whose primary purpose was gambling.8 9
Subsequently, Maritime Services filed a complaint with the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) alleging that the SCSPA had violated the Shipping Act, which commands the FMC to adjudicate the
grievances of private citizens.9 1t Specifically, the complainant contended that the SCSPA unreasonably refused to deal with,'-1 and discriminated against,'92 Maritime Services by giving berths to two
Carnival Cruise Line vessels that offered gambling activities to passengers. 3 Consistent with the remedies afforded under the Shipping
Act, 94 Maritime Services urged the FMC to seek injunctive relief in
federal district court, direct the SCSPA to pay reparations, interest,
95
and attorneys' fees, and issue a cease-and-desist order.
Pursuant to the FMC's Rules of Practice and Procedure,9 6 the
Commission referred Maritime Services' complaint to an administrative law judge (A.L.J.), who subsequently granted the SCSPA's motion
to dismiss on the grounds of Eleventh Amendment immunity.9 7 The
A.L.J. reasoned that if "'Congress is powerless to override the States'
immunity under Article I of the Constitution, it is irrational to argue
that [the FMC], created under an Article I statute, is free to disregard
the [Eleventh] Amendment or its related doctrine of State immunity
from private suits."'''9 8 Nonetheless, the A.L.J. noted that the FMC
could still conduct its own formal investigation of Maritime Services'
allegations and enforce on its own behalf any violations of the Ship-

ping Act in federal district court. 99 However, the Commission reviewed the A.LJ.'s dismissal sua sponte and reversed, holding that
"'[t]he doctrine of state sovereign immunity... cover[s] proceedings
89

Id.

9)
91

See 46 U.S.C. app. § 1710(a), (b) (2000).
See id. § 1709(b)(10) (prohibiting common carriers from "unreasonably refus[ing]

to deal or negotiate").
92 See id. § 1709(d) (4) ("No marine terminal operator may give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage or impose any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage with respect to any person").
9" See Fed. Mar. Cornm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1868 (2002).
94 See 46 U.S.C. app. § 17 10(g), (h)(1) (2000).
95 See Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 122 S. Ct. at 1868-69.
9(
See 46 C.F.R. § 502.223 (2002).
97 See Fed. Mar. Comma, 122 S. Ct. at 1869; S.C. Mar. Servs., Inc. v. S.C. State Ports
Auth., No. 99-21, 2000 WIL 126799 (Fed. Mar. Comm'n Jan. 5, 2000). A previous decision
by the Fourth Circuit had conclusively determined that the SCSPA was an arm of the State
of South Carolina, see Ristow v. S.C. Ports Auth., 58 F.3d 1051, 1053-55 (4th Cir. 1995), and
no party in this case contested that determination. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 122 S. Ct. at 1870
n.6.
98 Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 122 S. Ct. at 1869 (quoting S.C. Mar. Servs., Inc., 2000 WL 126799,
at *6).

99

See id. at 1869 (citing S.C. Mar. Servs., Inc., 2000 WI. 126799).
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before judicial tribunals, whether Federal or state, not executive
branch administration agencies like the Commission.""0'
B.

The Fourth Circuit's Reaction

The SCSPA filed a petition for review and the Fourth Circuit,
with Chief Judge Wilkinson writing for a unanimous panel, reversed
the FMC's judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss.' (' Focusing on the Supreme Court's decisions in Seminole
Tribe1 2 and particularly Alden v. Maine ItI"(which held that state sovereign immunity from private suits applies in fora outside the federal
judiciary), the court noted that "a state's sovereign immunity is not so
'04
fleeting as to depend upon the forum in which the state is sued."'
Thus, the court held invalid "any proceeding where a federal officer
adjudicates disputes between private parties and unconsenting states
...whether the forum be a state court, a federal court, or a federal
'0
administrative agency."'

5

Further, the court rejected the Commission's contention that sovereign immunity was inapplicable since the administrative adjudication was not a "suit in law or equity,'' 11 but merely a form of
regulation in which the agency endeavors to effectuate congressional
intent. 0 7 The court stated that the precise nature of the agency adjudication process suggests that the A.L.J. occupies a role "'functionally
comparable"' to that of an Article IIIjudge. 018 In particular, the Shipping Act and the Code of Federal Regulations employ a significant
number of procedures in the A.L.J. context similar to those used in
federal litigation, including the following: the filing of formal complaints by private parties;"' 9 the utilization of depositions, written interrogatories, and discovery procedures;''( the use of the subpoena
power by the A.L.J. to compel the production of documents and the
attendance of witnesses; I'' and the power of the A.L.J. to determine
the scope of the proceeding, rule upon orders of proof, act upon petitions to intervene, fix the time for the filing of documents, and "dispose of any other matter that normally and properly arises in the
)o

Id. (quoting S.C. Mar. Servs., Inc. v. S.C. State Ports Auth., No. 99-21, 2000 WL

359791, at *4 (Fed. Mar. Comm'n Mar. 23, 2000)).
101
See S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 243 F.3d 165, 179 (4th Cir. 2001).
102 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
103
527 U.S. 706 (1999).
104
S.C. State Pors Auth., 243 F.3d at 167.
105
Id. at 173 (emphasis added).
1OB U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
107
See S.C. State Ports Auth., 243 F.3d at 173.
108
Id. at 174.
109
See 46 U.S.C. app. § 1710(a) (2000).
110
See id. § 1711(a); 46 C.F.R. § 502.147 (2002).
III
See 46 U.S.C. app. § 1711 (a).
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course of [the] proceedings."' 12 Thus, the court upheld the applicability of the state sovereign immunity doctrine because, regardless of
its placement within the Executive Branch, the FMC's adjudicative
proceeding "walks, talks, and squawks very much like a lawsuit."'
C. The Supreme Court Affirms the Fourth Circuit
1. Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's decision after
granting the FMC's petition for certiorari.' 14 Justice Thomas began
his opinion' ' 5 by noting that "[d] ual sovereignty is a defining feature
of our Nation's constitutional blueprint" and that the states "entered
the Union 'with their sovereignty intact."" I' 6 One element of that sovereignty included the states' immunity from private suits, which was
memorialized in, but not based on or defined by, the Eleventh
Amendment.' '

7

Thus, Justice Thomas considered "whether the sovereign immunity enjoyed by States as part of our constitutional framework applies
to adjudications conducted by the FMC."' 18 The FMC contended-as
it had ruled earlier on review-that sovereign immunity only shields
states from exercises of judicial power, not agency adjudications.' -'
Justice Thomas conceded, arguendo, that the FMC did not exercise
the judicial power of the United States, and he admitted that history
provided little help in determining whether the Framers believed that
the sovereign immunity doctrine applied to formal administrative adjudications, as such proceedings were unprecedented in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.' 2 " However, under the Hans
presumption-that the Constitution was not intended to endorse proceedings against the states that were "anomalous and unheard of
when the constitution was adopted"1 2 '-the Court "attribute [d] great
significance to the fact that States were not subject to private suits in
administrative adjudications at the time of the founding or for many
2
years thereafter." 2
112

46 C.F.R. § 502.147.

1 I" See S.C. State Ports Auth., 243 F.3d at 174.
114
Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1870 (2002).
115 Chief JIstice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy joined JUstice
Thomas. See id. at 1867.
116

Fed. Mar. Comm 'n, 122 S. Ct. at 1870 (citing Blatchford v. Native Viii. of Noatak, 501

U.S. 775, 779 (1991)).
117 See id. at 1870-71.
118
Id. at 1871.
119 See Brief for Petitioner at 17-25, Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S.
Ct. 1864 (2002) (No. 01-46).
120 See Fed. Mar. Comm',, 122 S. Ct. at 1871-72.
121
Id. at 1872 (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 18 (1890)).
122
Id.
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In order to decide whether the Hans presumption definitively applied, Justice Thomas analyzed FMC adjudications "to determine
whether they are the type of proceedings from which the Framers
would have thought the States possessed immunity when they agreed
to enter the Union." 123 Like the Fourth Circuit, 124 Justice Thomas
discerned significant similarities between the roles of the A.L.J. and an
Article III judge as well as the rules regulating the proceedings they
oversee. 25 He reasoned that because
the Framers thought it an impermissible affront to a State's dignity
to be required to answer the complaints of private parties in federal
courts, [it is unimaginable] that they would have found it acceptable to compel a State to do exactly the same thing before the administrative tribunal of an agency. . . . The affront to a State's
dignity does not lessen when an adjudication takes place in an administrative tribunal as opposed to an Article III court. In both instances, a State is required to defend itself in an adversarial
proceeding against a private party before an impartial federal
1 6
officer. 2
Furthermore, to deny states immunity from administrative proceedings would create a paradox, permitting Congress to use its Article I
powers to adjudicate private claims against the states in front of administrative tribunals while prohibiting it, under Seminole Tribe, from
using those same powers to abrogate state sovereign immunity in Arti12 7
cle III judicial proceedings.
Finally, Justice Thomas rejected the federal government's attempt to distinguish FMC administrative proceedings from Article III
courts on the ground that the Commission's orders are not self-executing and thus pose no threat to the financial integrity of the
states. 128 Such a distinction, he said, was "without a meaningful difference."' 129 Absent sovereign immunity, either the state defends itself
before the FMC or loses the right to argue the merits of its position in
its appeal of the Commission's determination.l""' If the state ignores
the FMC's order, the Commission can impose penalties for noncompliance and request that the Attorney General recover the fine in fed123

Id,

See S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 243 F.3d 165, 174 (4th Cir. 2000).
See Fed. Mar. Commn, 122 S. Ct. at 1872-74. Justice Thomas also noted that where
FMC adjudications are not covered by a specific Commission rule, the FMC's Rules of
Practice and Procedure provide that the ALJ will follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 1874 (citing 46 C.F.R. § 502.12 (2001)).
126
Id. at 1874-75 (citations omitted).
124
125

1875.

127

Id. at

128
129

See id. at 1875-78.
Id. at 1875.

130

Id. at 1875-76.
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eral district court."" Justice Thomas concluded that such coercion,
regardless of its toll upon the state's treasury, affronts the dignity of
1 2
the state and thus violates the sovereign immunity doctrine. Dissenting Opinions

2.

3 3 ArguJustice Breyer,joined by three otherJustices, dissented.
ing that federal administrative agencies can adjudicate complaints by
private persons against states, Justice Breyer emphasized that agencies
definitively exercise Article II executive powers regardless of any resemblance their processes might bear to the activities of legislatures or
courts. 13 4 Furthermore, unlike typical court proceedings, an FMC adjudication allows extensive use of hearsay, determines factual disputes
through official notice, and permits the agency to completely disre35
gard the A.Lj.'s initial decision-as occurred in the instant case.'
In addition, the agency cannot enforce its own orders but must rely
on an enforcement order by an Article III court.' 3
In sum, Justice Breyer maintained that agencies do not exercise
the judicial power of the United States when adjudicating the merits
of private complaints. Thus, the text of the Constitution and in particular the Eleventh Amendment, which refers only to the 'Judicial
power," fails to provide support for the majority's conclusion that
states are immune from agency proceedings. 13 7 In fact, the only textual support offered by Justice Thomas was the Court's prior decision
in Alden v. Maine and its highly abstract references therein to a "constitutional design," a "system of federalism," and the "plan of the convention." 381 In Justice Breyer's view, the majority's holding could not
13 9
stand absent historical or constitutional support.
Rather, opined Justice Breyer, an analysis of the constitutional
history actually illustrates the frailty of the majority's analogy between
an administrative adjudication triggered by a private complaint and a
private lawsuit against a state. 141 Particularly incriminating is the feu-

131 Id. at 1876 (citing 46 U.S.C. app. § 1712(a) (1994 & Supp. V)). State sovereign
immunity does not extend to actions brought by the United States. See id.
See id. at 1879.
132
133 Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined Justice Breyer's opinion. See id. at
1881.
13'4 See id. at 1882 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529-30 (1935); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953 n.16 (1983)).
The adjudication in question, Breyer noted, involved "a typical Executive Branch agency
exercising typical Execitive Branch powers." Id. at 1883.
135
See id. at 1882-83 (citing 46 C.F.R. §§ 502.156, 502.226, 502.227, 502.230 (2001)).
13 6
Id. at 1883 (citing 46 U.S.C. app. § 1712(e) (1994 & Supp. V)).
137 See id. at 1883-84.
138
See id. at 1884 (citing 527 U.S. 706 (1999)).
139

1,1.

140

See id.
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dal analogy, relied on in Alden v. Maine, that forbids a citizen ("vassal") to sue a state ("lord") in the "lord's" own courts, but permits the
citizen to sue in the courts of the "higher lord"-here, the federal
government.1 41 Furthermore, the Framers believed that the federal
government could sue a state without the state's consent. 42 Justice
Breyer contended that the Framers did not conceive of sovereign immunity applying beyond the federal courts and in fact anticipated
some form of administrative regulation of the states by the Executive
("higher lord"). 14 1 Thus, the mere absence of explicit instructions
from the Framers and the dearth of administrative experience in the
eighteenth century do not preclude adjudications of private com144
plaints against states in agency proceedings.
Justice Breyer also countered the majority's claim that agency
proceedings constitute a form of coercion by a private party against a
state, thus offending the latter's "dignity."' 45 First, private citizens
cannot compel a state to comply with the law since any suit brought by
a private party to enforce an agency order would be subject to the
sovereign immunity defense. 146 That is, only the federal government
can make the SCSPA obey the requirements of the Shipping Act. Furthermore, as a practical matter, other privately initiated pressures
which do not merit sovereign immunity protection or affront the
states' dignity-such as complaints to Congress to enact legislation or
requests to an agency to engage in rulemaking-may compel states to
comply with federal law. 1 47 In addition, states can always protect their
dignity by seeking judicial review of the initial agency decision, a proceeding in which the agency, not a private party, serves as the
respondent.

48

Finally, Justice Breyer examined the practical consequences of
the majority's decision and determined that they did not justify extending sovereign immunity to administrative proceedings. 149 For example, while the decision still permits agencies to bring enforcement
actions against states, it requires that the agency rely more heavily
1 5
upon its own resources to investigate the merits of complaints. 0
"The natural result is less agency flexibility, a larger federal bureaucracy, less fair procedure, and potentially less effective law enforce141
142

143
144
145
146

147
148

149
150

Id. (citing Alden, 527 U.S. at 741).
Id. at 1885.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 1886-87.
See id. at 1886 (citing 46 U.S.C. app. § 1713 (1994)).
See id. at 1886-87.
See id. at 1887 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2342(3) (B) (iv), 2344 (1994)).
See id. at 1888-89.
Id. at 1888.
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ment," particularly of laws designed to protect worker health and
safety and regulate improper medical care.1 5 1 In tandem with the
Court's previous restrictive interpretations of the Constitution's structural constraints, 152 Justice Breyer argued that the majority's holding
"restricts far too severely the authority of the Federal Government to
regulate innumerable relationships between State and citizen ... [and
153
therefore] reaffirms the need for continued dissent."'
In addition to joining Justice Breyer's dissent, Justice Stevens
wrote separately to further criticize the Court's decision in Alden v.
Maine154-a predicate for the majority's holding-as supported by
neither history nor the structure of the Constitution. 5 5 Justice Stevens also objected to the majority's reliance on the "dignity" rationale, 56 suggesting that the Eleventh Amendment was a response to
the decision in Chisholm v. Georgia,'57 and merely restricts the federal
district courts' jurisdiction under the state-citizen diversity clause of
Article III. 1 5

Thus, Justice Stevens argued that if the Framers' true

concern was the protection of the states' dignity, then surely they
159
would have immunized the states from process as well.
III
CASE ANALYSIS-A TEMPEST IN THE TEAPOT

A.

"What's Past Is Prologue"161-FederalMaritime Commission as
an Extension of the Court's Recent Sovereign Immunity
Jurisprudence

As Justice Breyer and his counterparts in dissent suggest, the
holding in Federal Maritime Commission was not inevitable. First, like
almost all of the Supreme Court's significant sovereign immunity jurisprudence since Hans v. Louisiana,I6' the decision lacks any firm textual support in the Eleventh Amendment, which literally limits only
151

Id.

152 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996).
153 Fed. Mar. Comnan, 122 S. Ct. at 1889 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
154 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
155 Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 122 S. Ct. at 1879-80 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
156 See id. at 1880-81.
157 See 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
158 See Fed. Mar. Conm'n, 122 S. Ct. at 1880 (StevensJ., dissenting). The drafters of the
Amendment specifically left Chisholm's personal jurisdiction holding undisturbed. See id.
159 See id. Lacking immunization from process renders states susceptible to suit in federal court, but not to actions by private parties.
160

WILLIAM

SHAKESPEARE,

TilE TEMPEST act 2, sc. 1, 1. 249 (David Lindley ed.,

Cambridge Univ. Press 2002) (1610) [hereinafter THE TEMPEST].
161
134 U.S. 1 (1890).
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the 'Judicial power of the United States"'162 and not the Executive
Branch. As Justice Breyer noted, independent agencies, such as the
Federal Maritime Commission, are generally considered to exercise
executive branch powers, regardless of the resemblance their activities
bear to the traditional functions of legislatures and courts.t163 Accordingly, commentators often describe administrative adjudications as
"quasi judicial,"'164 distinguishing the proceedings as another means
of executing the laws.
Second, Justice Thomas's inability to rely on the text of the Elev' 65
enth Amendment and its "relatively barren historical record'
forced him to support the majority's holding by uncharacteristically
employing a functionalist analogy between the FMC's adjudicative
procedures and federal civil litigation. 166 Yet again, however, Justice
Breyer exposed the tortuous alignment of the analogy, noting that
unlike federal courts, FMC proceedings permit the use of hearsay, the
determination of factual disputes through official notice, and allow
the agency to disregard the initial decision of the A.LJ. 16 7 Furthermore, unlike Article III courts, the FMC lacks enforcement power,
ironically forcing it to seek implementation of its orders from the
168
same judicial power to which it was analogized by the majority.
Such inconsistencies suggest that Federal Maritime Commission
merely continues the Supreme Court's "hodgepodge of confusing and
intellectually indefensible" Eleventh Amendment case law. 169 However, in many respects the decision is a sensible extension of the
Court's sovereign immunity jurisprudence over the last one hundred
years. In particular, both Hans and Alden explicitly hold that the
scope of state immunity exceeds the text of the Eleventh Amendment,
which merely delineates one aspect of a constitutionally vital doctrine. 17 Furthermore, Seminole Tribe-reaffirming the constitutional162
163

U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
See Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 122 S. Ct. at 1881-82 (BreyerJ., dissenting); see also Whitman

v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472-73 (2001); Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S.
868, 910 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
164
See, e.g., 3 CHARLLS H. KocHi JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 12.13, at
177-79 (2d ed. 1997).
165 Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 122 S. Ct. at 1872.
166
See id. at 1872-75.
167
See id. at 1882-83 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
168 See id. at 1883 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
I6(_9 John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1891 (1983).
170
SeeAlden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) (stating that "the sovereign immunity
of the States neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment"); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890) (noting that although the plaintiff resided in the defendant state, the principles of sovereign immunity embedded in the
Eleventh Amendment forbade the suit regardless of the apparent inapplicability of the
Amendment's text).
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ity of the immunity recognized in Hans-dictatesthat Congress may
not abrogate state immunity via its Article I powers.171 This limitation
applies regardless of whether Congress exercises absolute jurisdiction
over the issue in question.17 2 Most important, however, is the Hans
presumption that "no anomalous and unheard-of proceedings . . .
were intended to be raised up by the Constitution .... "173 If states
remain immune from actions unknown at the time of ratification,
then they should be equally impervious to agency adjudications initiated by private parties, which became prevalent only in the twentieth
century.
Federal Maritime Commission's position at the crossroads of the Supreme Court's sovereign immunity jurisprudence helps to explain the
angle of the dissent's attacks. Justice Breyer, for example, focuses primarily on the dearth of textual and historical justifications for the majority's decision rather than on its practical implications, which he
only hypothesizes. 174 Similarly, Justice Stevens criticizes the Court's
prior decision in Alden v. Maine and its "'embarrassingly insufficient"'
reliance on the "dignity" rationale. 75 While both of the dissenters'
targets are important predicates for the majority's holding, they remain abstractly removed from the issue of whether or not to preclude
agency adjudications of private complaints against states. Evidently,
both Justice Breyer and Justice Stevens are content to rehash issues
decided in prior cases rather than deal with the matter at hand. 176 Or
more accurately, perhaps they must rehash these issues in order to
achieve their desired result; the majority's argument collapses only if
Hans, Seminole Tribe, and Alden fall.
Thus, in FederalMaritime Commission one sees the Court replaying
an old and familiar scene. While the majority contends that state sovereign immunity is a fundamental principle embedded in the structure of the Constitution, the dissent adheres to a pre-Hans view of
state immunity as explicitly set forth in the text of the Eleventh
Amendment. 17 7 That is, the dissent maintains that one hundred years

See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996).
Seminole Tribe, for example, involved Congress's power under the Indian Commerce
Clause. See id.
173 Hans, 134 U.S. at 18.
174 See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1881-89 (2002)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
175 See id. at 1879-81 (StevensJ., dissenting) (quoting Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 94).
176 As the majority noted, "[ustice Breyer's] quarrel is not with our decision today but
with our decision in Seminole 'ribe ... ."Id. at 1878 n.18.
177 See id. at 1884 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[U]nless supported by considerations of
history, of constitutional purpose, or of related consequence, th [e] abstract phrases [of the
Eleventh Amendment] cannot support today's result.").
171
172
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of precedent, beginning with Hans, is in error. 178 The dissent assumes
that states should be liable for violations of federal law and that fed97
eral supremacy prevails over state sovereignty and independence. 1
The true drama of the dissent lies not in their systematic exposure of
the decision's practical implications, but rather in their demand that
over one hundred years of precedent should fall.
B.

"The Isle Is Full of Noises"'
Loopholes

8

-Practical

Implications &

The Court's decision in Federal Maritime Commission extends the
8
state sovereign immunity doctrine and the holding of Seminole Tribe' '
into administrative fora, barring federal agencies from using adjudicative procedures to determine the merits of private party complaints
against a nonconsenting state.18 2 The holding applies regardless of
the relief sought by the private plaintiff, prohibiting the administrative tribunal from granting monetary relief and issuing cease-and-desist and other injunctive orders against the state for infractions of
federal law.'8 3 In addition, lower federal courts appear willing to
stretch the Court's reasoning beyond the specific facts of the case and
apply it to other agencies, statutes, and adjudicative schemes.18 4 In
this regard, Federal Maritime Commission constitutes a potent weapon
for enhancing states' rights.
Nonetheless, the majority in FederalMaritime Commission explicitly
identified a number of well-established exceptions to the state sover178
Numerous scholars adopt the dissent's position. See, e.g.,
William A. Fletcher, The
Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Reply to Critics, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1261,
1287-91 (1989) (refuting one scholar's claim that the Eleventh Amendment was not a wellreasoned rebuttal of Hans); David L. Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the
Pennhurst Case, 98 HARv. L. REv. 61, 70 (1984) (noting that "the rationale of Hans v.
Louisiana, if not the result, should be regarded as an enforced error-a choice that was
neither required nor fruitful"). In addition, for many years at least fourJustices have taken
such a stance. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 76 (Stevens, J.,dissenting), 100 (Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.,
dissenting); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,
301-03 (1985) (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.,
dissenting) (arguing that
the Eleventh Amendment only bars jurisdiction in suits against an unconsenting state
brought under the state-citizen diversity clause in Article III, but does not restrict suits
against an unconsenting state brought under admiralty or federal question jurisdiction).
179
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 7.3 at 396-98, 402 (3d ed. 1999).
180 THE TEMPEST, supra note 160, act 3, sc. 2 1. 27.
181
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
182
See 122 S. Ct. at 1874.
183
See id. at 1879.
184
See, e.g., R.I. Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt. v. United States, 304 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2002)
(applying sovereign immunity to whistleblower proceedings under the Solid Waste Disposal Act); Nelson v. La Crosse County Dist. Attorney, 301 F.3d 820, 838 (7th Cir. 2002)
(holding that Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to adversarial proceedings in
bankruptcy).
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eign immunity doctrine that may constrict the decision's reach. 1 85
These common-law devices, the Court argued, ensure the effective enforcement of federal law against states while preserving states' dignity
and their treasuries.' 8 " Consequently, the Court reasoned, the decision places few, if any, practical constraints on the ability of federal
agencies to regulate state action. 8 7 This section explores the sovereign immunity exceptions the Court identified in FederalMaritime Commission and investigates other loopholes to the doctrine that may
promote the effective enforcement of federal law by both federal
agencies and private parties.
1. Federal Enforcement
Perhaps the most entrenched exception to Eleventh Amendment
immunity is that states remain subject to direct suit by the United
States government and its agencies. 18 8 Thus, immunity will not bar
"the very common enforcement paradigm in which the federal agency
itself, or the U.S. Attorney, brings the complaint."' 18 '- Justice Thomas
recognized this exception in FederalMaritime Commission: federal agencies may continue to initiate proceedings against states based on their
independent determinations-even if the information regarding the
infraction and the request to investigate originate from a private
party. 19" Thus, he surmises, the decision will have very little effect on
the efficient enforcement of federal law. I9 '
Yet, as Justice Breyer suggested, if federal agencies must always
prosecute on their own behalf and cannot rely on the use of "private
Attorneys General," 192 it seems plausible that "potentially less effective
law enforcement" may result if the government must always deploy its
own resources for a prosecution to occur.19 3 For example, consider
185 See Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 122 S. Ct. at 1878-79 (noting that the FMC remains free to,
inter alia, institute its own administrative proceedings against a state-run port).
186 See id. at 1879.
187 See id. at 1878-79.
188 See United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-41 (1965); United States v. Texas,
143 U.S. 621, 644-45 (1892). Similarly, the immunity cannot be asserted in a suit brought
by another state. See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 83 (1907).
189

PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw: CASES AND COMMENTS 1113 (10th ed.

2003).
1.)o See Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 122 S. Ct. at 1878-79.
191

See id.

192 See Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14 (1942) (stating that private
litigants' standing is limited to their serving as "representatives of the public interest");
FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477 (1940) (holding that the Communications Act of 1934 confers standing on financially injured individuals to appeal the FCC's
issuance of a broadcasting license); see also Associated Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc. v. Ickes, 134
F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943) (introducing the term "private Attorney Generals [sic]"),
vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
19. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 122 S.Ct. at 1888 (Breyer, J.,dissenting).
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cases commenced in federal district courts during the twelve-month
period ending March 31, 2002.194 Of those concerning environmental matters, the federal government brought suit in only twelve percent. 19 5 Similarly, of the 2,009 cases filed under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, the United States brought only six percent, and of the
19,859 employment civil rights cases filed (under the Americans with
Disabilities Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act), the
United States merely brought two to three percent.' 9 6 Thus, while the
majority emphasized the presence of agency enforcement, the federal
government litigates only a small fraction of cases with public and private remedies, suggesting that private parties play a crucial role in federal law enforcement. Furthermore, the majority's position assumes
that the interests of private parties and the federal government are
aligned. If a federal agency-under its virtually unreviewable discretion to prosecute 1 9 7-refuses a request to institute an enforcement action, then regulatory beneficiaries may be left without any remedy
against the state.' 98
Nonetheless, these numbers are insufficient and may be misleading in several respects. First, they fail to distinguish suits against states,
a prime concern of this Note, from those against other defendants.
Second, they only reflect adjudications in federal court, not before
administrative tribunals where the agency functions as investigator,
prosecutor, and judge. 199 However, they do suggest that private parties have made significant contributions to the enforcement of federal
law and thus could serve a similar function in administrative courts.

See STATISTICS DIVISION, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDTable C-2, http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2OO2/tables/c02mar02.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2003) (disregarding suits where the United States
was the defendant).
195
See id.
196 See id.
197 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (citations omitted) ("[T]he
Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to
prosecute a case."). Moreover, an agency's decision not to enforce is "presumptively unreviewable." Heckler v. Chancy, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).
194

ERALJUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS,

198

See STRAUSS, supra note 189, at 1113-14.

199 See Jon C. Dubin, Torquemada Meets Kajka: The Misapplication of the Issue Exhaustion
Doctrine to Inquisitorial Administrative Proceedings, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1289 (1997) (noting
that benefactory agencies typically employ informal "inquisitorial" adjudicative models,
where the A.L.J. not only decides the case but also has the authority and responsibility to
investigate the facts and develop the record). Statistics concerning federal agency adjudications remain elusive, even for individual agencies. To gain a better understanding of
such adjudications, one needs further statistical analysis, specifically the number of agency
adjudications where a state was the defendant, and of those, how many were initiated by
private parties (prior to the prohibition of such actions in Federal Maritime Commission).
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Furthermore, such responsibility in the hands of private parties would
2
save precious.federal resources. 1111
2.

Suits Against Local Governments

Another factor diluting the potency of FederalMaritime Commission
is the Court's longstanding position that Eleventh Amendment immunity does not extend to local governments and municipalities.'11
Those institutions remain subject to suit by private parties in both
state and federal court, although sufficient connections between a
2 2
state and a local government may immunize the latter from suit. 0

For example, the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred
recovery against a county program funded almost exclusively by the
state's coffers. 20-3 Yet such circumstances are rare-the majority of social services, including police and fire protection, education, and sanitation, are all funded largely with local resources. 20 4 In this respect,
suits against local governments and municipalities may be the most
important exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity.
3.

Intervention Rights

Federal involvement in a privately initiated suit against a state
may similarly mitigate the practical implications of Federal Maritime
Commission. A recent First Circuit decision, for example, suggests that
federal intervention in an agency's adjudicative proceeding could remove a state's sovereign immunity bar. 20 5 In Rhode Island Department of

EnvironmentalManagement v. United States, state employees alleged that
their employer had retaliated against them for reporting what the employees believed to be a violation of the Solid Waste Disposal Act
(SWDA) .206 Under the Act's whistleblower provision, 20 7 the employees initiated four separate administrative proceedings, each seeking
monetary and injunctive relief and conducted in accordance with the
formal hearing provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. 2°18

The A.LJ. rejected the state's claims that sovereign immunity precluded the actions. 20 9 However, before the A.LJ. could determine the
200
This is apparently a popular goal, given the current political climate disfavoring the
expansion of most administrative agencies. See Andrew J. Ruzicho & Louis A. Jacobs, 25
EMI'. PPAcs. UPDATE, Dec. 2002, at 6.
201
See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977);
Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890).
202
See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Haldernan, 465 U.S. 89, 101-02 (1984).
20 3
See id. at 123-24.
204

See

205

See R.I. Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt. v. United States, 304 F.3d 31, 53-54 (1st Cir. 2002).

206

See id. at 38.
See Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6971 (2000).

207
208
209

CHEMERINSKY,

supra note 179, § 7.4, at 406.

See RI. Dep't of Envtt. vtgnt., 304 F.3d at 37-39 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 554 (2000)).
See id. at 38 n.2.
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merits of all four claims, the state brought an action in federal district
court to enjoin the proceedings. 2 The district court granted the injunction on sovereign immunity grounds, barring any further prose2 11
cution of the employees' claims before the Department of Labor.
The First Circuit affirmed, noting that "although [FederalMaritime
Commission] involved a different administrative agency, a different federal statute, and a different scheme of administrative adjudication, we
see no basis for distinguishing [its] central holding." 21 2 Nonetheless,
while the court rejected the appellants' numerous attempts to circumvent the sovereign immunity bar, it made one "important observation."'2 13 Under federal regulations, the Secretary of Labor could
intervene in the A.LJ. proceedings as a party or amicus.

21 4

According

to the court, the federal government so joining the suit "after it has
been initiated by otherwise-barred private parties .. .cures any Elev-

enth Amendment or sovereign immunity defect, and the private parties may continue to participate in the suit."2 15 The court of appeals

thus modified the district court's ruling, allowing the Secretary to take
2 16
such action.
Thus, at least under the SWDA's administrative scheme to protect
whistleblowers, Rhode Island offers some hope for private party plaintiffs seeking recourse for state violations of federal law. First, the decision reaffirms that states cannot enjoin the investigative arms of
agencies from receiving complaints from private parties, conducting
21 7
investigations, and determining liability based on those complaints.
Second, it suggests that upon a determination by the investigative arm
of an agency that the complaint of a private party has merit, the
agency will possess considerable incentives to intervene in the subsequent hearing before the A.L.J. and cure the sovereign immunity defect.2 18 Such action permits the private party-at least partially-to

maintain its prosecutorial role.

212

See Rhode Island v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 2d 269, 272 (D.R.I. 2000).
See id. at 273-79.
See R. Dept of Envl. Mgmt., 304 F.3d at 46.

213

See id. at 53.

210
211

214 See id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 24.6(0(1) (2000)).
2t5 See id. (citing Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 124 F.3d 904, 913
(8th Cir. 1997), affd, 526 U.S. 172 (1999); Seneca Nation of Indians v. New York, 178 F.3d
95, 97 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam)).
216 See id. at 53-54.
217 See id. at 54 n.13; see also Ohio Envtl. Prot. Agency v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 121 F.
Supp. 2d 1155, 1167-68 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (permitting the agency to continue its investigation in order to decide whether to participate as a party in subsequent proceedings).
218
See, e.g., Ohio Envtl. Prot. Agency, 121 F. Supp. at 1168 (ordering that once a private
party files a complaint against the state under one of the "federal whistleblower environmental statutes, the Department of Labor must, after full investigation, determine whether
the claim has merit and whether the agency itself will join the action").
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Nevertheless, the usefulness of agency intervention as co-plaintiff
in the agency's own hearings remains limited. First, at least two district courts have rejected the distinction drawn in Rhode Island and
Ohio EnvironmentalProtectionAgency between the investigatory and adjudicative phases of OSHA proceedings for purposes of sovereign immunity.2lt) Thus, the possibility exists that in some courts all
administrative proceedings against states relating to a private complaint, including investigations, may be enjoined via sovereign immunity principles. An additional complication is that, like traditional
federal enforcement actions, intervention drains resources from the
federal budget and renders Congress unable to reap the full potential
of "private attorneys general." ' 2 211 More fundamentally, using agency

intervention to counteract sovereign immunity subjects federally created private party rights to the agenda of the current administration.
Whistleblowers under the SWDA, for example, may subject themselves
to retaliatory attacks from state employers who know that an environmentally hostile administration and Secretary of Labor care little
about protecting such informants. Ultimately, the scenario could deteriorate to the point where federal law and the rights of parties Congress intended to protect are left completely lifeless.
4.

Ex parte Young

In addition to agency intervention, another and perhaps more
worthwhile course of action may exist for private parties seeking relief
in administrative courts for state infractions of federal law. In 1908, in
Ex parte Young, the Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits seeking prospective equitable relief to discontinue an ongoing violation of federal law by state officers. 22 1 The Ex
parte Young doctrine permits federal courts to order future compliance by state officials (even when doing so will cost the state money),
yet the doctrine forbids courts from awarding retroactive damages to
be paid by state treasuries. 22 2 Thus, hypothetically, the probation officers in Alden v. Maine223 could have obtained an injunction against
the answerable state official directing the future payment of overtime
as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act, although the officers
could not have recovered the unpaid overtime to which they were
219 See Conn. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. OSHA, 138 F. Supp. 2d 285, 296 (D. Conn. 2001);
Florida v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1289-90 (N.D. Fla. 2001).
220 See Ruzicho & Jacobs, supna note 200, at 5-6.
221
See 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908). The Court based its holding on the premise that
state officers acting contrary to the Constitution or federal law act illegally, and thus strip
themselves of their official capacity and consequently, any derivative immunity. See id.
222 See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 665-69 (1974); CHiEMFRINSKY, sulfra note 179,
§ 7.5 at 418.
223 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
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due. 224 Although criticized as a fictional distinction between a state

and its officers, 2' 5 Professor Chemerinsky notes that without it "federal courts often would be powerless to prevent state violations of the
'2
Constitution and federal laws."

26

Might Ex parte Young serve a similarly important role in the administrative context? Commentators note that the cruise line's requested cease-and-desist order in Federal Maritime Commission appears
"analogous to [those] situations in which Ex parte Young has applied."2 2

7

The Supreme Court, however, completely omitted any ref-

erence to the doctrine, 228 holding that "the relief sought by a plaintiff
suing a State is irrelevant to the question whether the suit is barred by
the Eleventh Amendment." 2' 2'

The underlying cause of this omission,

of course, was that the Fourth Circuit had previously found the Ex
parte Young exception irrelevant to the case because the cruise line
brought the complaint for both legal and equitable relief against the
State Ports Authority, not its officers. 2"1' As a result, Federal Maritime
Commission offers little help in determining the utility of the Ex parte
Young doctrine in administrative hearings.
The First Circuit, in Rhode Island Department of EnvironmentalManagement v. United States, also averted the issue, holding that it could not
properly consider applying the Ex pane Young exception to Rhode Island's immunity because the appellants failed to sustain such an argument and the record proved inconclusive. 2 3 ' Nonetheless, the court
suggested that if the individual appellants satisfied the Ex parte Young
predicates (i.e., named their managers at the Department in their
complaints and sought prospective equitable relief), then "the conplaint might not be barred by sovereign immunity."' 23 2 Similarly, a
federal district court in Florida recently hinted at the suitability of administrative whistleblower claims for injunctive relief against individuals named in their official capacity, analogizing such proceedings to

224
STRAUSS, supra note 189, at 1114. The officers in Alden, however, did not request
prospective relief because by the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the State of
Maine had brought itself into compliance with the FLSA's wage and hour requirements.
See Mills v. Maine, 118 F.3d 37, 41 (1st Cir. 1997).
225
See, e.g., CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 13 FEDERAL PRAcTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3524,

at 151-54 (2d ed. 1984).
226
CiEMERINSKY, supra note 179, § 7.5, at 415.
227
William Funk, Supreme Cour News, ADMIN. & RE(. L. NEWS, Summer 2002, at 25.
228 See id.
229
See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1879 (2002) (quoting Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996)).
23(
See S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 243 F.3d 165, 167 (4th Cir. 2001).
231
See R.I. Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt. v. United States, 304 F.3d 31, 52 (1st Cir. 2002).
232
Id.
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traditional lawsuits.2 "3 These decisions, along with the Supreme
Court's recent reliance upon Ex parte Young to defeat an Eleventh
Amendment claim in federal court,2 34 signify a revival of the exception.
Accordingly, Justice Breyer's fears regarding the majority's holding in
FederalMaritime Commission may prove unfounded.
Without a clear signal from the Supreme Court-or any federal
court-such conjectures about the viability of the Ex parte Young doctrine will remain uncertain. Yet they should not, particularly in light
of the Court's emphasis in FederalMaritime Commission on the similari2 35
ties between traditional lawsuits and administrative adjudications.
That is, if the state sovereign immunity doctrine applies equally in
both the judicial and administrative spheres, then so should the
means of circumventing it.23" 6 Hence, Ex parte Young will likely remain

a viable option for private parties in administrative proceedings seeking an injunction against a state officer to end a continuing violation
of federal law. This would not only protect private parties (particularly whistleblowing employees), but would also ensure that the federal government retains the flexibility and resources necessary to
monitor and remedy state violations of the Constitution and federal
laws.
5.

CongressionalActions
a. Abrogation

Another factor mitigating the Court's decision in Federal Maritime
Commission is Congress's limited ability to abrogate state sovereign immunity. While Seminole Tribe precludes Congress from abrogating
state immunity via any statute passed under Article I of the Constitu3 7
Congress may do so by adopting laws pursuant to its Fourtion, 2
teenth Amendment enforcement powers. 238 Yet to pursue the latter
See Florida v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1291-92 (N.D. Fla. 2001). The
court declined to rule on the issue since the question had yet to be addressed in the administrative forum. See id. at 1292 n.17.
2'14 See Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 122 S. Ct. 1753 (2002); see also
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atl.-Pa., 271 F.3d 491, 508 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that the
court continues to view Ex paite Young as generally applicable whenever a plaintiff seeks
prospective relief against individual state officers for a continuing violation of federal law).
23 5
See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1872-74 (2002).
236
However, the Supreme Cotirt has held that where Congress has created a detailed
remedial scheme for the enforcement of a federal statutory right against a state, a federal
court cannot obtain jurisdiction via application of Ex parte Young over an action which
seeks a remedy beyond that which Congress made available. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44, 74 (1996). If one is to rely on the present analog', then such a congressionally
imposed limitation would also apply in the administrative context.
237 See id. at 72-73.
238 See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
670 (1999). However, such abrogation is improper where the statute exceeds the scope of
the Fourteenth Amendment's protection. See Bdl. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531
233
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option Congress must make its intention "unmistakably clear in the
language of the statute,"239 and the provision must create the necessary "congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented .

.

. and the means adopted to that end.'

24

While some commentators suggest that these strict standards may
disqualify the majority of regulatory programs, 24 if one relies on the
analogy between judicial and administrative proceedings, then abrogation of state sovereign immunity in the administrative arena appears
proper. While such a scheme leaves those federal rights created pursuant to Article I unprotected, 242 it could nevertheless prove to be a
powerful tool in guaranteeing state compliance with many federal
laws. State employers discriminating on the basis of race, for example,
could be subject to privately initiated administrative proceedings pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which applies to the
states through Congress's Section 5 powers.2 43 Environmental
whistleblowers could be given similar recourse, as Congress enacted
such protections to safeguard First Amendment rights made applica244
ble to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
b.

"Gift" or "Gratuity" Waivers

A final exception to the state sovereign immunity doctrine is voluntary state waiver of its immunity and consent to suit in a particular
forum. 245 Could such a waiver somehow mitigate the ruling in Federal

Maritime Commission by allowing private parties to initiate agency adjudicative proceedings against states? Explicit waiver by a state of its imU.S. 356, 364 (2001) (holding that nonconsenting states cannot be sued tinder Title I of
the Americans with Disabilities Act, which accords more protection to disabled persons
than the Equal Protection Clause).
239
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000) (citations omitted).
240 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
241
See, e.g., STRAUSS, supra note 189, at 1115.
242
The most glaring example is the anti-discrimination and negotiation protections
afforded by the ShippingAct. See46 U.S.C. app. § 1709(b)(10), (d)(4) (2000). Since Congress passed the Act pursuant to its Article I maritime powers, it could not abrogate state
sovereign immunity. Similarly situated are the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Fair Labor Standards Act. See Ruzicho & Jacobs, supra note 200, at 3.
243 See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (holding that recovery under the Civil
Rights Act is not precluded by the Eleventh Amendment).
244 Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management v. United States suggested such
an approach. See 304 F.3d 31, 51 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S.
563, 574-75 (1968), which held that the "First and Fourteenth Amendments protect the
right of public employees to speak on matters of public concern"). The First Circuit rejected the appellants' claims, however, on the grounds that Congress did not express a
clear intention to abrogate the states' immunity. See id.
245 See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
670, 675 (1999) (citing Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447-48 (1883)); see alsoAtascadero
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985) ("[I]f a State waives its immunity and
consents to suit in federal court, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the action.").
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munity to suit in a specific adjudication or by statute, of course, always
remains a viable option. However, courts have rejected the notion
that a state explicitly waives its immunity by "voluntarily [partaking] in
any facet of a federal adjudicative proceeding," such as answering a
complaint or conducting discovery.2 4" The Supreme Court has placed
similar constraints on constructive waivers, holding that mere participation in a federally regulated activity-such as accepting the requirements of the federal Medicaid Act in exchange for funds-no longer
constitutes consent to suit in federal court. 247 That is, Congress may
not coerce a state into relinquishing its immunity by threatening to
' 248
exclude it from participating in an "otherwise lawful activity."
A recent decision from the Third Circuit, however, suggests that
one form of congressionally initiated constructive waiver may remain
a viable option.2 49 Congress, pursuant to its powers under Article I,
may "require a state to waive immunity in order to engage in an activity in which the state may not engage absent congressional approval,
or in order to receive a benefit to which the state is not entitled absent
a grant or gift from Congress." 25 1 These "gift" or "gratuity" waivers are
valid provided that Congress makes clear its intent to require a waiver
25
of immunity, and the state unambiguously and voluntarily accepts.
Furthermore, the activity or benefit must not be an "otherwise lawful"
pursuit for the state; rather, it must be an activity in which states can
engage only with the express leave of Congress. 25 2 Because the state,
through the "gratuity," effectively exercises federal power, Congress
may attach to its grant any conditions it chooses, including the surrender of the state's sovereign immunity.2 5 3 Thus, the Third Circuit
found that a public utility knowingly waived its sovereign immunity by
voluntarily accepting a congressional "gift" of the power to regulate
local telecommunications competition under the Telecommunica246
R.I. Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt., 304 F.3d at 48-49 (distinguishing Lapides v. BcI. of Regents, 122 S. Ct. 1640, 1643 (2002) (holding that a state waives its Eleventh Amendment
immunity by removing a case fliom state to federal court)).
247
See Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 687; Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v.
Fla. Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 150 (1981) (per curiam).
248
Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 687.
249
See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atl.-Pa., 271 F.3d 491 (3d Cir. 2001).
250
Id. at 505. Four other circuits have upheld this version of constructive waiver. See
Bell At. Md., Inc. v. MCI Worldcom, Inc., 240 F.3d 279, 292 (4th Cir. 2001) (vacated on
othergroundsbyVerizon Md., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Md., 122 S. Ct. 1753 (2002), in
which the Court did not reach the question of waiver, finding that Ex parte Youngpermitted
the suit to go forward); AT&T Commtinications v. BellSouth Telecomm. Inc., 238 F.3d 636,
645-46 (5th Cir. 2001); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 222 F.3d 323, 340 (7th
Cir. 2000); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Ptub. Serv. Comm'n, 216 F.3d 929, 937 (10th Cir.

2000).
252

See MCI Telecomm. Coip., 271 F.3d at 505-06.
Id. at 510.
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Id.
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tions Act of 1996, where the state could only assume that role with
25 4
congressional authorization.
Similarly, "gift" or "gratuity" waivers could play an important yet
limited role in the context of administrative proceedings. For exampie, under the Supremacy Clause, 255 the Supreme Court has held that
Congress, according to its enumerated powers, may expressly or impliedly preempt state law by either defining the scope of the preemption or "occupying the field" of legislation. 256 As a result of
Congress's Commerce Clause power to regulate maritime affairs (as
well as interstate commerce),257 any state legislation attempting to
govern ocean-borne commerce could be preempted by federal laws
such as the Shipping Act. 25-8 Congress could not simply abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment immunity of state terminal operators. Yet it
could "gift" to a state the optional power to regulate or arbitrate unreasonable and discriminatory practices by private marine terminal
operators, 259 which due to prior federal preemption is clearly not an
"otherwise lawful" activity. If the state accepts the "gratuity" voluntarily, Congress could then demand in exchange that the state relinquish its sovereign immunity in federal administrative fora, thus
allowing private parties to initiate proceedings against unreasonable
state-run terminals. On the other hand, a state wishing to preserve its
sovereign immunity could decline the offer,2
and the regulatory
power would simply revert to the Federal Maritime Commission.
Both Congress and the states possess incentives to broker such a
deal. A state would assume a role in the federal regulatory scheme,
allowing it some economic control over its own ports and waters via
the opportunity to conduct arbitrations among feuding terminals, carriers, and other competitors. The surrender of its Eleventh Amendment immunity might be a small price to pay for such power over
local trade and industry, although in doing so it might forfeit a competitive advantage its own maritime operators have over private facilities. 2 6' The federal government would preserve its investigative
254

See id. at 513.

255 See U.S. CONsr. art. VI, cl.2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof.., shall be the supreme Law of the Land .. ").
256 See, e.g., Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 222 (1995) (holding that an
express preemption provision in the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 precluded state regulation of air carriers); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n., 461 U.S. 190, 222-23 (1983) (holding that the Atomic Energy Act impliedly
preempted state law).
257
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3 ("To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States ... ").
258
Shipping Act of 1984, 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1701-19 (2000).
259
See MCI Telecomm. Corp., 271 F.3d at 510.
260
See id. at 511.
261
SeeS.C. State Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 243 F.3d 165, 178 (4th Cir. 2001),
affd, 122 S.Ct. 1864 (2002).
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resources because private party disputes would be subject to arbitration by the state in the first instance, not regulation by the Federal
Maritime Commission. Similarly, the Commission would save
prosecutorial resources, given that state infractions of federal law
could be litigated in federal agency adjudications by private parties
due to the state's waiver of its sovereign immunity. In sum, the potential advantages to both states and the federal government render "gift"
or "gratuity" waivers an important exception to the state sovereign immunity doctrine.
C.

2-Federal Maritime Commission as
"Rounded with a Sleep"2 13
Part of the Rehnquist Court's Agenda to Constrict
Congress's Ability to Impose and Enforce
Regulatory Standards

As discussed, a number of factors suggest that the holding in Federal Maritime Commission will do little to hinder the effective enforcement of federal law. As the Court recognizes, the United States
government may directly bring, 263 or intervene in, 264 actions against

states. In addition, local governments continue to exist outside the
sovereign immunity shield, 2 65 as do state officials sued for prospective
injunctive relief.2"" Coupled with Congress's ability to abrogate states'
immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment,2 6 7 and to entice states
to waive their immunity by offering "gifts" of federal regulatory
power, 268 the "striking feature" of the sovereign immunity doctrine
becomes its apparent worthlessness as a means of promoting federalism. 2" 9 Thus, assuming the popular analogy between judicial and administrative adjudications holds fast, the Court's endorsement of the
state sovereign immunity doctrine in agency adjudications also appears to possess little value.
Yet it is imperative to view the holding in FederalMaritime Commission from outside the sovereign immunity paradigm. Doing so reveals
that the Court's recent Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence is just
one part of an extensive conservative plan to constrict Congress's ability to impose and enforce regulatory standards against states. Other
lines of federalist jurisprudence, while perhaps less aggressive in over262 THE TEMPEST, supra note 160, act 4, sc. 1 1. 258.
26-3 See Fed. Mar. Cornrn'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1878-79 (2002).
264 See R.I. Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt. v. United States, 304 F.3d 31, 53 (1st Cir. 2002).
265 See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280-81 (1977);
Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890).
266 See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908).
267 See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
670 (1999).
See MCI Teleconrn. Corp. v. Bell Atl.-Pa., 271 F.3d 491, 510 (3d Cir. 2001).
268
Set, Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism
269
Decisions, 69 U. Cii. L. REv. 429, 459 (2002).
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ruling prior holdings and reformulating modes of analysis, 270 have imposed considerable substantive and remedial limitations on
congressional power. This section provides a brief sampling of these
additional restraints, both to place Federal Maritime Commission in its
proper context and to explain how a decision that appears so ineffective-particularly after a survey of the exceptions and loopholes to the
sovereign immunity doctrine-could generate such an apoplectic response from liberal justices and scholars.
1.

Substantive Constrictions

In 1995, the Supreme Court embarked on ajourney to curb Congress's substantive regulatory powers, which at that time had remained
unchecked since the early days of the New Deal. 27' By invalidating a

federal statute prohibiting the possession of firearms in school zones,
the Court in United States v. Lopez restricted the scope of Congress's
authority to regulate interstate commercial activities. 272 Specifically,
the Court signaled that it would no longer accept at face value Congress's assertions of power under the Commerce Clause. 273 Thus, the
Court refused to uphold a statute that regulated education and
crime-matters traditionally monitored by the states-where Congress failed to offer any hard evidence that guns in schools affected
interstate commerce. 274 More recently, the Court overturned the Violence Against Women Act on the grounds that gender-motivated
crimes were not economic activity and thus did not fall under Congress's commercial regulatory powers. 275 Although neither decision
overruled any precedent or seriously modified the Court's analysis of
Commerce Clause issues, 2 76 both sent a clear signal that the Court
would police Congress's attempts to regulate activities traditionally reserved to the states, particularly where the commercial nature of the
activity was in question.
Other decisions regarding Congress's power to directly regulate-or commandeer-state and local governments sent similar
270

See id. Fallon explains the Court's boldness in its recent sovereign immunity juris-

prudence as stemming from the Court's repeated invocation of sovereign immunity as a
symbol of federalism and the conservative Justices' hostility to suits for money damages
against state governments. See id. at 482-83.
271
The last time the Court invalidated a federal statute on the ground that it was
beyond Congress's power under the Commerce Clause was in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., decided in 1936. See 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
272
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
273
See id. at 562-63.
274
See id.
275
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607-19 (2000) (affirming the Fourth
Circuit's decision to strike down 42 U.S.C. § 13981).
276
See Fallon, supra note 269, at 475-77 (maintaining that the Court's recent Commerce Clause decisions reflect no dramatic advance toward a more robust constitutional
federalism).
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signs. Whittling away at the principle expressed in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority--that the judiciary lacks the ability to identify state activities immune from federal regulation 2 77 -in
1992 the Court distinguished one such area of state autonomy when it
held that the federal government could not compel a state legislature
to regulate on behalf of federal objectives. 2 78 In 1997, the Court
broadened the noncommandeering principle to encompass the
states' executive departments, holding unconstitutional provisions in
the Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act that required state and
local law enforcement officers to participate, albeit temporarily, in the
administration of a federally enacted regulatory scheme. 279
City of Boerne v. Flores echoed similar federalism concerns-and
placed further substantive restrictions on Congress's ability to impose
regulatory standards-by invalidating the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).281 Congress passed the Act under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to reaffirm the right to free exercise of religion. 28 1 The Court held that Congress has no power under the Fourteenth Amendment to substantively interpret constitutional
provisions-such as declaring the meaning of free exercise or defining fundamental rights-that could bind states. 28 2 Rather, Congress
possesses solely remedial powers under Section 5, which must only be
exercised in a closely tailored fashion to meet a very clear violation of
Section 1.283" As noted by Professor Tribe, this restriction successfully
burdens Section 5 legislation "with something between intermediate
and strict scrutiny."2 8 4 Further, it effectively forces Congress to enact
important legislation that clearly fits within the goals of the Fourteenth Amendment under its other powers,2 85 some of which may suffer from similar circumscriptions under the Court's recent federalism
jurisprudence.

277 469 U.S. 528, 546-47 (1985).
278 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
279 See Printz v. United States, 52] U.S. 898, 933 (1997).
280 See 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
281 An earlier decision by the Court had severely restricted rights under the Free Exercise Clause, insulating generally applicable laws from free exercise attack. See Employment
Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). Congress, after intense
backlash, adopted the RFRA, instigating the Flores case. See Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb to bb-4 (2000).
282 See Flores, 521 U.S. at 519.
28
See id.at 519, 532-33.
284
1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 5-16, at 959 (3d ed. 2000).
285 An example of such legislation is the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 5, 28, and 42 of the United States Code).
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Remedial Constrictions

While the bark of federalism may lie in the Court's attempts to
curb Congress's substantive powers, its true bite may reside elsewhere.
Just as the Court has limited Congress's power to create substantive
federal rights, it has also restricted which entities Congress can authorize to enforce those rights. One such remedial constriction, of
course, is the Court's expansion of the Eleventh Amendment. However, state sovereign immunity is just one of the more robust limitations that the Court has placed on potential federal litigants.
Contemporary standing doctrine constitutes one such example,
which is best exemplified by the Court's decision in Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife.286 Under the Endangered Species Act's "citizen suit" provision entitling "any person" to bring suit, 28

7

the plaintiffs claimed an

injury-in-fact arising out of the failure of both the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of the Interior to comply with the Act's consultation

requirement. 28

The

Court held

that "congressional

conferral upon all persons of an abstract, self-contained, noninstrumental 'right' to have the Executive observe the procedures required
by law" is not sufficient to confer standing. 28 9 In creating this abstract
right, said the majority, Congress exceeded the standing requirements
of Article 111.290 Rather, the alleged injury must be particularized and
not undifferentiated, and the substantive or procedural rights in question designed to protect some threatened concrete interest of the
plaintiff.29 1 Thus, Congress could not broadly empower the citizenry

to bring suit, thereby circumventing the environmental enforcement
efforts of the current executive and transforming the federal courts
into "'continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive
action.' "292
Professor Fallon notes another line of decisions whereby the
Court has promoted federalism and protected local treasuries by constricting Congress's remedial powers. 293 Section 1983 of Title 42 of
the United States Code creates a legal entitlement of relief against any
"person who, under color" of state law, deprives another of his federal
286 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
4
287 See Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 15 0(g)(1) (2000) (providing that "any
person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf to enjoin any person, including the
United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency ... who is alleged to
be in violation of any provision of this chapter").
See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 558-59 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2)).
288
Id. at 573.
289
290
See id. at 574-76.
291 See id.; cf Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23-25 (1998) (holding that
one of a large class of citizens who enjoys a statutorily created "right" to information has
standing; the injury-in-fact is the'particular citizen's inability to obtain information).
292
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 760 (1984)).
293
See Fallon, supra note 269, at 463.
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rights. 29-4 Although the complexities of Section 1983 actions are beyond the scope of this Note, they perform a vital function "as the 'basic vehicle' for federal court review of alleged state and local violations
of federal law." 2 - 5 Interestingly, however, while municipalities are

generally considered "persons" under Section 1983,2913 recent decisions by the Court "establishing standards of municipal liability make
it exceedingly difficult to prove that local governments are causally
responsible, and thus directly liable, for wrongs committed by their
officials."2 9 7 The Court has placed similar limitations on suits against
officers under Section 1983, creating varying levels of official immunity so as to protect the treasuries of those state and local govern29
ments that indemnify their employees.
3.

Revisiting the Implications

When viewed amongst some of the substantive and remedial constrictions placed upon Congress's ability to impose and enforce regulatory actions, the impetus behind the Supreme Court's holding in
Federal Maritime Commission becomes clear. Specifically, precluding
agency adjudications of private complaints against states furthers a
number of federalism principles that the Court has endorsed over the
last ten years. First, although not a per se substantive limitation on
congressional power, the majority's repeated references to state "dignity" advance the notion that the states themselves are sovereign entities, and are thus due a significant amount of autonomy from the
federal government. Second, as with the limitations on standing and
Section 1983 actions, the decision limits Congress's ability to empower
private citizens to prosecute state infractions of federal law. Only the
supreme power of the federal government should be able to hold
states responsible for such violations. Hence, like Lujan, the decision
promotes the power of the executive over Congress, the judiciary, and
the private citizenry, to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
Ultimately, the holding in Federal Maritime Commission must be
seen as just one part of the Court's crusade to protect the states from
congressional action. Only when viewed on this macro scale do the
majority's reasoning and the dissent's seething response make sense.
Adhering to the federalist principles they have promoted over the last
ten years, Justice Thomas and his colleagues in the majority easily rea42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
CHEMERINSKV, supra note 179, § 8.1, at 450. "Over [ten] percent of the federal
court docket consists of § 1983 suits." Id. (citation omitted). In particular, § 1983 creates
the cause of action for nearly all of the federal courts' constitutional rulings arising fiom
the actions of local governments and municipalities. See id. at 450-51.
296
See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 662-63 (1978).
297
Fallon, sulra note 269, at 463.
294
295

298

See id. at 464.
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son that agencies cannot adjudicate private complaints against the
states-holding otherwise would offend their vision of state autonomy, limited congressional power, and a robust executive. The dissent reacts vehemently, yet not out of a fear that the decision itself will
severely curtail the efficient enforcement of federal law; a number of
factors, such as the Ex parte Young doctrine and federal intervention,
soften the Eleventh Amendment's initial sting. Rather, it is as if the
dissent, confronted with a true agency case and a clear infringement
of a federally created right, suddenly appreciates the extent to which
the majority is blatantly promoting its vision. In this respect, Justice
Breyer's call for "continued dissent 299 signals more than continued
resistance to the majority's state sovereign immunity decisions-it provokes a jurisprudential war along a much broader ideological
spectrum.
CONCLUSION

In Alden v. Maine, Justice Kennedy stated that "the bare text of the
[Eleventh] Amendment is not an exhaustive description of the States'
constitutional immunity from suit. ' 30 0 Rather, state sovereign immu-

nity operates as a fundamental yet elusive principle embedded in the
structure of the Constitution and subject to generous interpretations
by the Supreme Court. The holding in Federal Maritime Commission
offers one example of the doctrine's inherent ambiguity: the Court
deployed a functionalist analogy between the FMC's adjudicative procedures and federal civil litigation to preclude agency adjudications of
private complaints against states. As demonstrated, this correlation is
suspect at best, particularly in light of the stark differences between
the two proceedings and the FMC's clear exercise of executive, not
judicial, power. Yet the decision clearly embraces the state sovereign
immunity principle kindled in Hans and stoked in Alden and Seminole
Tribe that "no anomalous and unheard-of proceedings .. .were in-

tended to be raised up by the Constitution." 30 1 In this respect, one
must admire the majority for its consistency and admonish the dissent
for its blatant departure from the doctrine of stare decisis.
Furthermore, a number of well established and potential exceptions to the state sovereign immunity doctrine will undoubtedly lessen
the impact of the Court's holding. While further statistical data must
be gathered to discern the exact impact that the adjudication by agencies of private complaints against states could have on the enforcement of federal law, for now it appears that such actions are not
299

Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1889 (2002) (Breyer,

J., dissenting).
300
527 U.S. 706, 736 (1999).
301
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 18 (1890).
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critical. Certainly, the agencies themselves can and do serve as the
prosecutors in such actions, and the Court has long held that local
governments and municipalities, the primary providers of social services, fall outside of the Eleventh Amendment's shield. Intervention
by the federal government could also remove the states' sovereign immunity bar, as could congressional abrogation of the states' immunity
where appropriate, and the use of "gift" waivers. Most importantly, it
appears that private parties will continue to be able to seek prospective equitable relief to discontinue ongoing violations of federal law by
state officers.
Yet FederalMaritime Commission stings, and Justice Breyer howls in
pain. This is because the decision, while practically anodyne, reaffirms the significant and ongoing shift in the Court's jurisprudence
towards a dogma the dissent abhors-robust state autonomy, limited
congressional power, and a particularly potent executive. It is typical
Greek theater, as the players in the dissent, already doomed by the
heartless gods, nevertheless play out their roles with gusto. The pot, it
seems, has boiled over, and the dissent gets burned.

